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An approach to a force level problem which incorporates inputs of
cost, operational effectiveness and requirements into a decision procedure
is suggested. The problem is then defined within the framework of a
decomposable linear program. The linear program is given an interpretation
which emphasizes operational effectiveness at the point of use. A
central authority -- subordinate element dialogue is postulated in the
interpretation and conducted in the presence of the market mechanism
implied by the decomposable linear program.
A specific task, illustrative of the more general technique, is
taken as the derivation of a model which permits a central defense
planner to resolve conflicts between military operational theaters for
the purpose of programming construction of an amphibious force for use
in all theaters.
A decentralized decision process for determination of force levels
is described. The application of the decomposition algorithm to the
central defense planner-military theater commander interchange employed
in the decision process is developed.

The procedure under which amphibious force acquisition is
presently accomplished is examined by solution of the linear program
using a set of postulated theater tactical plans.
Conclusions are drawn which contrast the interpretation ordinarily
given the decomposable linear program with the interpretation suggested
for the model constructed. The general applicability of the model is
discussed, means of improving and expanding the model presented
and additional uses described.
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INTRODUCTION
The capability of the U.S. to protect its commitments abroad depends
greatly on the availability of military forces trained and equipped for
amphibious operations. The level of this military capability is
restricted by the defense budget, however, and must compete with other
equally critical defense requirements for funding. The Marine Corps
and Navy face the problem of deciding upon the composition of a least
cost amphibious force effective for operations in world-wide coastal
maritime areas
.
In particular, minimum cost force level objectives must be
determined for an array of feasible types of amphibious ships and vehicles
to accomplish a set of missions related to different geographical areas.
The difficulty is that contingency plans in likely theaters of
operation impose conflicting requirements. Different types of military
units are needed for amphibious operations in the Middle East (desert)
and Southeast Asia (jungle). Heavily armored and highly ground-mobile
forces are most effective in desert warfare. In contrast, armor is
severely restricted in the jungle and lighter helicopterborne forces
are more useful. Even more significant are the variations in expected
opposition and sea and terrain conditions that would influence the
conduct of amphibious operations in the separate theaters. Despite
these differences in types of units and conditions of employment,
budget considerations place a finite limit on the construction of forces
of ships and vehicles for amphibious operations. Any force selected
should clearly be capable of assault operations in all operational theaters,
but should be acquired at minimum cost as well.

Allocation of Public Services - An Analogy
It may be useful to place this type of military force level problem
in a more familiar context. The choice of an amphibious force which
will operate effectively to meet conflicting requirements in different
theaters finds an analogy in the more commonly encountered problem of
furnishing public services. Consider, for example, the provision of
the service of fire protection by a town.
The problem of providing fire protection as viewed by a local
government can be visualized by assuming a setting in which a town is
divided into a business section, a pier section, a housing section and
an agricultural section. Suppose that the town is attempting to decide
on the composition of a fire-fighting force which will provide fire
protection to each section. Suppose also that the town budget will
permit the purchase of only one set of equipment to be centrally
positioned in the local firehouse. The problem is complicated by the
characteristics of the separate sections, which are markedly dissimilar.
The types of equipment most effective in one section may either be less
useful or of no use at all in another. The relative value of a fireboat
in the pier section, for example, would presumably differ from its
value in the housing section.
The problem of selecting the most suitable composition of the
fire-fighting force to be acquired can be approached by: (1) establishing
the level of fire protection to be afforded to each section; (2) measuring
the value of this level of protection in terms of potential property
saved from damage in each section; and (3) determining the value of the

3separate contribution to protection which different types of fire-
fighting equipment can make to each section. If the sum of the per unit
value of protection provided by a particular type of equipment over all
sections of the town is less than its cost, it will not be purchased.
Similarly if, at any point, the sum of the values attributed to an
equipment type in the four sections exceeds its cost, additional units
should be acquired up to the point where its value at the margin equals
its cost.
The most difficult aspect of the approach suggested is the evaluation
of the effectiveness of various types of equipment in the different sections.
An alternative available to the town is to decentralize the decision by
permitting each section to determine its own relative values for the
different types of equipment. Although conflicts could be expected
(because each section would attempt to maximize its own protection
without regard to the impact of such behavior on the effectiveness of
the fire-fighting force in other sections), participation of the sections
would insure that the force selected is adequate to provide the established
level of protection in every section.
An analytic technique which would allow each section of the town
to participate in the selection of the fire-fighting force and at the
same time coordinate the equipment evaluation procedure in a way which
insures that the sum of the per unit values of each type of equipment
acquired equals its cost would clearly be useful.
The explanatory value of the analogy between the problem of
providing a given level of fire protection to separate sections of a town
and that of selecting an amphibious force capable of meeting a stipulated

operational requirement is perhaps more apparent at this point. The
fire-fighting force is mobile and can afford a certain level of fire
protection to any section, using all or a portion of the available
equipment. The amphibious force is also mobile and similarly can be
deployed as a whole or in part to supply a given level of amphibious
capability to any theater. Also, one type of amphibious ship or
vehicle may yield a very different effectiveness in each theater (as in
the fire boat example of the town)
.
Another important similarity between the two problems is that the
sum of the per unit values of the amphibious "protection" provided by
a particular ship or vehicle should not exceed the cost of its acquisition
A third parallel is observed in the expected reactions of the
sections of the town and the theaters to the invitation to participate
in the decision-making process. The theaters equally with the sections
will attempt to influence the composition of the force in such a way as
to insure optimal coverage of their own unique situations by attributing
higher value to equipment most useful locally. The upshot is that,
from an analytic viewpoint, the two problems are essentially the same.
Development of the Analogy
In the present paper, the analogy between the problem of furnishing
fire protection facing the town and that of the central defense planner
An assumption is implied that not more than one fire (or
contingency) will occur at a time. This assumption could obviously
break down in either case, and is used only to limit the size of the
requirement.

concerned with selecting a balanced military force at minimum cost is
demonstrated by the development of a method of force level planning
which relies on techniques of economic analysis applicable to both the
fire-fighting and amphibious forces. The specific task, illustrative
of a more general technique, is taken to be the derivation of a model
which will enable the central planner to resolve conflicts in requirements
between theaters for the purpose of programming construction of a force
of amphibious vehicles and ships which can effectively transport and
deliver a Marine landing force from ship to shore under varying conditions
of geography, enemy opposition and landing force composition.
The force of amphibious ships and vehicles (called the amphibious
force when combined) is akin to the fire-fighting force of a town in the
sense that it must meet the demands for protection of its separate
sections (theater contingency plans in the analogy) at minimum cost.
The analogy between the fire-fighting force decisions of the
city government and defense force level decisions can be extended by
supposing that commanders in the different operational theaters (sections
of the town) have developed separate tactical plans which represent
the most probable way in which an amphibious assault would be conducted
in the particular area for which the commander is responsible. It would
clearly be desirable to decentralize the decision-making process to permit
the responsible commanders to cooperate by employing these plans as
inputs to the analysis. Participation of the theater commanders in
this manner should insure adequate consideration of military operational
factors in the development of final amphibious force objectives.

6In succeeding chapters, the problem of the central planner is
given explicit form, and a technique for solving the problem through
a decentralized decision process is developed. The procedure under which
amphibious force levels are presently determined is also described and
examined. Finally, the decision process suggested is employed to solve




DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL
Background
The Marine Corps is the responsible service within the Department
of Defense for the development of systems and doctrines peculiar to
amphibious operations. The present concept for development of future
U.S. amphibious capabilities is based on a general tactical plan for
amphibious operations judged by the Marine Corps to be effective for
any geographical area and to provide an adequate forecast of force
level requirements. The postulated concept is (in its effect on force
objectives) a single plan which allocates certain landing force task
organizations in terms of troops, equipment and supplies to objectives
located ashore, to be delivered from Naval amphibious ships under
specified parametric restrictions of time and distance by a particular
means: helicopter, armored amphibians, or general amphibious vehicles.
Planning for acquisition of the amphibious force is accomplished under
the assumption that one plan (expressed as a set of operational parameters)
is a suitable framework for selection of component ships and vehicles
from a variety of feasible types in amounts sufficient to be effective
over probable contingencies.
Although the parameters established by the Marine Corps as minimum
amphibious force capabilities to be achieved are classified in part,
an unclassified version of the general objective is available and is
excerpted below :

"Utilization of the various tactical mobility means in proportions
dictated by the requirements of the mission will provide Marine air-ground
task forces with a capability to conduct initial assault operations at
ranges up to 50 nautical miles inland, and over an area which, in the
case of a force of division-wing size, may extend to approximately 600
square miles (roughly 20 by 30 miles)."
The underlined sentence states that the "tactical mobility means
available" (amphibious ships and vehicles) are to be employed in different
proportions according to the mission. The amphibious force must operate
effectively under fluctuating conditions of employment, but, in contrast,
force level objectives are derived from one hypothetical plan. The point
is that unless the plan provides more than enough amphibious ships and
vehicles for every contingency, it is unlikely to result in a force which
is most effective over a range of predictable missions. The present
concept for resource acquisition is equally dubious from a cost viewpoint.
If the plan results in excess ships and vehicles, then the cost of the
force is greater than its value in the defense sector and other, more
critical, activities in the government or private sector must be needlessly
cut back. Potential deficiencies of the "one plan" technique will
be demonstrated.
Employment of Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Future Amphibious
Operations. Marine Corps Order 3340.3, 20 April 1962.

Definition of the Problem
Suppose that the Marine Corps has been requested by the Secretary
of Defense to recommend a minimum cost amphibious force to meet approved
contingency plans of unified (theater) commanders for the period
1970-1979. Suppose also that the Secretary's request includes a
restriction that the amphibious force recommended need be capable only
of responding to one theater plan at a time, under the assumption that
2
no two contingencies will arise simultaneously. In order to act on the
request, the Marine Corps designates a central planner who reviews
the request and defines the problem: Develop recommendations for an
optimal force of amphibious vehicles and ships for world-wide employment
which takes explicit account at minimum cost of the differing operational
3
requirements of the theater commanders.
The amphibious force is taken to include only the amphibious
vehicles and the ships in which they are embarked to support the
movement ashore. Other Navy and Marine Corps resources are not
considered.
2
This assumption could easily be relaxed by expanding the
requirement to include development of a separate amphibious force for
each contingency. It is not considered realistic, however, to expect
that every contingency can or should be covered by a uniquely structured
amphibious force. Nevertheless, the decision process suggested in
the present paper can absorb any combination of amphibious forces and
theateis preferred to that postulated.
3The definition of the problem may appear to beg the real question
of optimality in the sense that it does not require analysis of alternatives
to requirements (in magnitude) of theater contingency plans for subsequent
policy level decision. This is true only to the extent that responsible
commanders may overestimate the size of the military force needed to
meet particular contingencies. The assumption implied by the definition
is that theater requirements have previously been evaluated by the
Secretary of Defense and found to be valid.
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The Approach . Certain information is given the planner.
Other information must be obtained. The planner determines an approach
which will identify the basic elements of the problem and then apply
these elements in an analytical model. The following procedure is
settled upon:
1. Obtain theater plans assigning output missions
(operational requirements) to the amphibious force
which are defined by the tonnages of Marine landing
force units to be delivered ashore in the (a) helicopter-
borne assault, (b) armored amphibian assault, and by
(c) general amphibious vehicle means.
2. Select an array of feasible candidate amphibious vehicles
and ships expected to be available in 1970.
3. Determine two types of ship and vehicle costs:
a. Investment and discounted peacetime
operating costs
b. Expected attrition costs of executing an
amphibious operation in each theater.
4. Compute the individual output capacities of each ship
and vehicle in the selected array in each theater.
5. Develop a model which minimizes cost subject to
constraints which insure that the aggregate output




6. Exercise the model using requirement, cost, and
output data obtained or computed to determine an optimal
"mix" of ships and vehicles and test the results.
Theater Output Missions . Theater tactical plans are submitted
to the central planner by the appropriate commanders. Requirements
are amphibious force output missions derived from these plans, which
each commander considers representative of the nature of probable large-
scale amphibious operations in his theater. The plans reflect differing
conditions of expected enemy opposition, geographical environment and
mission and composition of the Marine landing force. Each plan is
expressed by output parameters:
1. Theater vehicle output missions (in tons) in three
categories
:
a. Landing force maneuver elements to be
transported by helicopter for the purpose
of seizing inland objectives.
b. Landing force maneuver elements to be transported
in armored amphibians for the surface assault
against objectives in the beach area.
c. Combat support units of the landing force
to be delivered by other general amphibious
vehicle means.
2. The distance in miles from the amphibious ships to
inland objectives divided into land and water segments.
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3. The time in hours during which the initial assault is
to take place.
Development procedures and rationale for differing tactical plans
in four theaters are contained in Appendix 1. The amphibious force
decided upon must be capable of performing the output missions generated
by each of these plans. The theaters are Southeast Asia (SEASIA)
,
Middle East (MIDEAST), Northern Europe (NOREUR) and one worldwide "theater",
Counterinsurgency (CI) . Operational conditions imposed by these theaters
encompass the majority of situations in which amphibious operations are
likely to be conducted in the period 1970-79.
Candidate Vehicles and Ships . Vehicle types and ship classes
selected as feasible candidates by the central planner which are
available at present or can be available in quantity by 1970 are listed
and a brief description of the physical characteristics and output mission
in which each operates is provided in Appendix 2. It is from this list
that program objectives for the force "mix" for the period 1970-79 are
to be set. There are at least two competitors for selection in each
of the three output missions.
Costs . The procedure for developing cost information used by the
central planner places emphasis on two types of costs: investment
plus peacetime operating costs (the latter discounted at 10% from the
year 1970), and expected attrition costs. Investment costs for the




year 1970 are assumed to equal current acquisition costs of the candidate
vehicles and ships. Expected attrition costs for each theater are
computed as the product of : 1) estimated vehicle attrition (which
varies between theaters) ; 2) estimated probability of a contingency
arising in the theater; and 3) vehicle replacement (investment) costs.
Specific costs and details of the costing procedure are described in
Appendix 3.
Vehicle and Ship Output . The output or contribution which each
vehicle can make toward meeting the output mission in which it operates
in each theater is tabulated in Appendix 4. Vehicle outputs are computed
to show the number of short tons a vehicle type can deliver from ship
to shore within the parameters of time and distance specified by the
tactical plan of each theater. Ship outputs are the number of vehicles
by type which each ship can embark and operate.
The problem has been identified and laid out explicitly in a form
subject to analysis. The planner next turns to the task of developing
a model.
Construction of the Model
The purpose of the central planner is to recommend a force composi-
tion sufficiently effective to meet stipulated output missions
(requirements) while minimizing the cost of achieving that pre -determined
capability. The method of linear programming is useful in examining
problems of optimal allocation of resources to meet given output levels
at minimum cost, whether the issue is one of achieving a degree of
fire protection, as in the case of a community government, or of
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attaining a certain effectiveness for amphibious operations. A linear
program cannot, of course, be considered a completely accurate
representation of the real world. That is, it is at best an approximation
in mathematical terms of the interrelationships of the components of
an actual system. The usefulness of linear programming depends (as its
name implies) on certain critical assumptions of linearity, proportionality
and nonnegativity . To the extent that a system can be presumed to
reflect these characteristics, the method is useful, for it permits
manipulation of the system to be examined in a way which can add to
understanding of the economic and operational interactions of the various
components. The problem of determining force levels (selecting a
system) of amphibious vehicles and ships needed to meet different
theater output missions can be represented by the variables and
coefficients of a linear program. A model of the primal and dual of
this problem formulated as a linear program is constructed and
interpreted by the central planner as follows
:
Central Primal .
Let i = l,2,...,m - an index of operational theaters
For a discussion of the applicability of linear programming to
real world situations see Robert W. Dorfman, Paul A. Samuelson and
Robert W. Solow, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958), pp 8-9. For a description of
the assumptions made in applying programming to economic and military
problems see George B. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions





Q, - a vector of amphibious force vehicle levels
(Table III, Appendix 2).
Qp - a vector of amphibious force ship levels
(Table IV, Appendix 2).
X, ,X
2
,...,X - vectors of theater employment levels of
vehicles arrayed by type according to
ship class in which embarked and function
in theater output mission. One element
of this vector identifies the number of
vehicles of a particular type operated
in a certain output mission from a
particular class of ship. (Table V, Appendix 2)






C, - a vector of per unit vehicle investment and
discounted peacetime operating costs (Table VI,
Appendix 3)
.
C 9 - a vector of per unit ship class investment and
discounted peacetime operating costs (Table VI,
Appendix 3)
P,,P ,...,P - vectors of expected theater vehicle1' 2'***' m
attrition costs (Table VI, Appendix 3)
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L,,Lp,...,L - vectors of output tonnages defined by
theater helicopter, armored amphibian and
general amphibious vehicle output missions
assigned the amphibious force for delivery
of Marine landing force units ashore. One
element of this vector is the number of tons
which must be transported from ship to shore
by the specified means within the time period
allowed by the theater tactical plan.
(Table II, Appendix 1).
E, ,E~,...,E - matrices of theater per unit vehicle type
output tonnage capacities. One element of
this matrix is the number of tons a particular
vehicle type can transport from ship to shore
within the time period allowed by the theater
tactical plan. (Appendix 4, Page 87 ).
K - a matrix of vehicle distribution to different ship
classes for purposes of embarkation. One element of
this matrix identifies the ship location of a particular
vehicle type and the output mission in which the vehicle
is operated. (Appendix 2, Page 77).
F - a matrix of vehicle type per unit embarkation requirements
by ship class. One element of this matrix is the
proportion of the total embarkation capacity of a ship
class for a particular vehicle type occupied by one
such vehicle. (Appendix 4, Page 90 ).
I - the identity matrix
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Primal Objective Function .
m
Minimize: C' Q + C' Q2 + Z P! X.i=l
The objective is to minimize the sum of vehicle and ship
investment and annual peacetime operating costs and the expected
attrition costs of amphibious operations employing these resources.
Primal Constraints . The objective of minimizing costs is
constrained by functions which insure the availability of sufficient
vehicles and ships to meet theater output mission requirements.
(1) Output constraints: E. X. ^ L. i=l,2,...,m.
The aggregate output capacity of the helicopters, armored
amphibian and general amphibious vehicles employed in
the ith theater is adequate to meet respective output
missions
.
(2) Vehicle constraints: IQ - KX . > i=l,2,...,m.
The number of vehicles by type in the amphibious force
is at least as great as the number employed by type,
output mission, and ship class in which embarked in the
ith theater.
(3) Ship constraints: IQ2 - FX . ^0 i=l,2, . . . ,m.
The number of ships by class in the amphibious force
is adequate to embark and operate the vehicles employed








.H -H CN -H2 2
Sh h
0) P 0) PP 3 P 3
rci CX re a
0) P 0) P
o £8 o £8

















































0) >J QJ COP Ol p rH
m hi tfl a j
0) CXI 0) >
x 6iH C0I £ X
a CO
•H pH
XI u!> P CD
en co > COP o 0) r-\
ub C CJ J 01
01 >
o) e a) 0) 0)
rH P P H J
a CO re u
•H QJ P •H CX
X > 0) x H
a) c ex 0) X






































0) >, 0) :/)p o P H
rC r-\ m 0)
0) ex 0) >
























o) >g 0) w
P Ol p rJ
rrj HI rri tu




















































Central Dual . Underlying every primal minimization problem is
a dual problem of maximization. The variables of the dual linear program
completely impute per unit values of different outputs (vehicles and
ships in the instant case) to their per unit costs. In the optimal
solution, the value of the (maximized) objective function of the dual
exactly equals the (minimized) cost of the primal objective function.
Dual variables exhibit an economic interpretation which is very useful
in the present analysis, as will be shown. The variables, objective
function and constraints of the dual are listed and interpreted as
follows
:
Variables . Dual variables are related to the constraints





,...,tt - vectors of per unit value imputed to each vehicle
type in each theater for its contribution in
meeting a theater output mission. One element
of this vector reflects the reduction in total
cost of the amphibious force which would result
from the unit addition of a particular vehicle
operating in a specified output mission from a
particular ship class.
cp, ,cp9 , . . . , cp
- vectors of per unit value imputed to each ship
type in each theater for its contribution in
embarking the vehicles employed in a theater.
One element of this vector reflects the reduction
in total cost of the amphibious force which would
result from the unit addition of a particular ship
class.
For proof of these properties of a linear program see William J.
Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1965), pp 122-125.
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- vectors of value imputed to each ton of the
Marine landing force delivered from ship to
shore by helicopter, armored amphibian and
general amphibious means to meet theater
output missions. One element of this vector
is the per unit value of an added ton of the







Dual Objective Function .
** • mMaximize
: „ t T ft
i=l i i
The objective is to maximize the value of the output mission over
all theaters. The objective is equivalent to maximizing the total value
of the amphibious force in delivering the Marine landing force ashore
in all theaters.
Dual Constraints . The objective of maximizing the value of
the force is constrained by functions which require that the sums of the
per unit values imputed to the different ships classes and vehicle types
over all theaters do not exceed the per unit costs of these resources;
and that the value of the service rendered by the force does not exceed
the cost of its employment.
m
(1) Vehicle Value Constraints: £ n. < C,
i=l X " X
The sum of theater per unit values imputed to any vehicle





(2) Ship Value Constraints: S cp. < C 9
i=l 1 ~
The sum of theater per unit values imputed to any ship
class does not exceed the per unit ship investment and
peacetime operating cost.
(3) Vehicle Output Value Constraint:
E' 9. < P. + K f n. + F T cp. i=l,2,...,m
1 l — i i Ti ' ' '
The value of the output capacity (service rendered)
of the vehicles in the amphibious force in the ith
theater does not exceed the cost of their employment
in that theater. One element of the matrix E! 9. is
i i
the product of the vehicle output in tons and the value
imputed to one ton of the Marine landing force delivered
ashore. The element thus describes the total value of
the delivery service rendered (output) by the vehicle
in the ith theater. The constraint then relates these
values to the "costs" of potential employment of the
force where the value expressions K t tt. and F'cp. can be
considered opportunity costs which accrue from the non-
availability of the amphibious force in other theaters
while it is employed in the ith theater.
This constraint is re-formulated in the central dual
to conform with the dual structure: -K t tt. -F T cp. +E!0. < P.
i Ti ii—i
In this form the constraint states that the net value
(opportunity costs subtracted) of the vehicles must not
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Application of the Model
The central planner applies the linear program model in an analytic
process which insures that the amphibious force finally selected is
the minimum cost force operationally adequate for all theaters. The
analytic procedure employed is a decision process which depends upon
a discourse wherein resource levels are offered by the planner to theater
commanders who subsequently return vectors which measure the marginal
value of unit additions to the vehicle and ship elements of the resource
vectors. The discourse takes place within a framework of successive
solutions to the problem of the central dual and a theater dual linear
program (subproblem of the central dual) to be described presently.
The Planners Problem . The problem is to find force level vectors
Q , Q_, and X-. , X~,...,X which minimize total investment, operating
and expected attrition costs C,T Q, + C' Q + P,T X, + P' X„ + ..... + P' X^ 11 2v 1122 'mm
necessary to meet a certain set of output missions L., i=l,2,...,m.
The problem could be solved by the planner, using ordinary linear
programming techniques based solely on output missions submitted by the
theater commanders and other known information of vehicle output
capability, ship embarkation capacity and cost. A more interesting
and certainly more realistic method would be to permit the commanders
responsible for the conduct of probable amphibious operations to
participate in the solution by advising the planner of the operational
value each places on the vectors Q, , Q~ and L. i = 1,2,...,
m
The Theater Commander's Subproblem (Theater Primal) . The
commander's purpose is to minimize the expected attrition costs of




(1) E.X. ^ L. - (aggregate output capacity of that portion
of the amphibious vehicle force employed in the ith
theater is adequate to meet theater output
missions)
.
(2) K X. : IQ2 - (theater allocation of vehicles to the
different output missions does not exceed the
number available)
.
(3) FX . £ IQ„ - (ships employed in the ith theater to embark
and operate the theater amphibious vehicle
force do not exceed the number available)
.
Q
± , Q2 , X i £ i = l,2,...,m
The Market Mechanism . The similarity between the problem of the
central planner and the subproblem of the theater commander is evident.
Both desire to minimize costs. Both must insure that established theater
output missions for the amphibious force are met. Despite their parallel
interests and the desirability of a mutual exchange of information, no
means by which this dialogue might take place has as yet been identified.
One difficulty is that each requires information which can only be
provided by the other. Specifically, the vectors Q, and Q„ are
initially unknown to the commanders. The planner is also unaware of
the relative operational values which the commander might attach to
these resource vectors.
A solution to this apparent deadlock is found in the market
mechanism which is implicit in the formulation of the central and
theater linear programs. The operational values attributed by the theater
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commander to the elements of the resource vectors can be viewed as
"bids" which the commander will offer for the addition of a particular
vehicle or ship to the amphibious force. The planner recognizes that
there is no requirement for an actual exchange of dollars. It is only
necessary that the decision-making process proceed as if the theater
commander bids were in dollar terms. Clearly, if negotiations are
conducted in the presence of a market mechanism, the required motivation
for minimizing costs and marginal analysis will be active.
To see how the market mechanism operates, consider the logic which
might be used by the theater commander to generate the operational value
to his theater of additional vehicles or ships. The ith commander is
aware that underlying the theater primal is a set of dual variables which
will reveal precisely the added potential operational value to the ith
theater which will result from the unit addition of a particular vehicle
type or ship class to the amphibious force. Suppose that the theater
commander defines theater dual variables
:
tt. - a vector of bids which measure the operational value
1
to the ith theater of unit additions of vehicle types
to the amphibious force i = l,2,...,m.
cp. - a vector of bids which measure the operational value
to the ith theater of unit additions of ship classes
to the amphibious force i = l,2,...,m.
6. - a vector of values which measure the operational
value of a one -ton increase in the size of the
Marine landing force delivered from ship to shore
in the ith theater.
rr.
,
cp., 8. ^ i = 1,2,... ,m.
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The theater dual is derived from the theater primal linear




tt. -10' cp. + l!9. i = l,2,...,m
1 1 2 Ti i 1 '
Subject to: -K'tt. -F f cp. + E! 6. ^ P. i = 1,2,. ...mliii—i '
The solutions of the theater dual for the bid vectors tt. and cp.
i l
are, in effect, dollar values which the theater commander can use to
inform the planner of the operational worth he attributes at the margin
to the elements of the vectors Q, and Q~. The objective function states
that the commander desires to maximize the operational value to the ith
theater of the theater output mission (Marine landing force) requirement
and hence the net value of the amphibious force in the ith theater. The
objective is viewed as the net contribution which the Marine landing force
ashore in combat makes to the theater mission. This process is constrained
by a function which insures that the operational capability of the force
in the ith theater equals at least the cost of its potential employment
therein.
Planner-Commander Communication . The analytic means (bids)
which permit the theater commanders to participate in the force level
dec is ion -making process has been formulated. The validity of this
assertion is seen in the properties at the central dual. The central
dual is an angular system which will decompose into m theater subprograms
and one central master program. The Dantzig-Wolf e algorithm is available
for solving linear programs which are decomposable. The decomposition
See the description of this constraint in the central dual, page 21
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process exhibits properties which can serve the purpose of the central
planner. Most important, the procedure can be used as an analytic
device for decentralized decision-making.
The theater dual formed by the ith commander is a sub-problem
of the central dual. Solution of the theater dual will present vectors
of bids attributed by the ith commander to the vehicle and ship elements
of any resource vector Q , Q„ prof erred by the planner.
Inter-Theater Coordination . A means of analytic communication
between the planner and each commander using an implied market mechanism
has been established. The commanders are, in effect, consumers of the
planners product (resource vectors Q.. and GO . As consumers they will
presumably act independently in the "market" supplied by the planner.
A means of coordination is required because the planner is interested
in maximizing the aggregate value of the amphibious force. The ith
theater primal and dual do not accommodate bids of other commanders or
the planner's investment and operating cost vectors C, and C„. The ith
commander could be expected to maximize the value of the ith output
mission independently by attributing bids to the vectors Q, and Q„ which
reflect the unique characteristics of the ith theater only. Unfortunately,
this procedure may not yield an optimal or even feasible solution.
The problem is that theater bids are linked by the central dual
m m
constraints I! rr. < C, and I cp. ^ C . These constraints are
... l—l . , T i — 2i=l i=l
coordinating devices which require that, in the optimal solution, the sum
For properties of decomposable linear programs see George B.
Dantziq, Op. Cit., pp. 448-453.
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of the theater bids equal the per unit investment and peacetime operating
costs for each vehicle type and ship class. To see why optimality is
not possible otherwise, consider some intermediate stage of the process.
Since theater commanders are not constrained by the cost vectors C, and
C„ some vehicles which are very desirable in all theaters would presumably
reflect an aggregate bid greater than the sum of the per unit investment
and operating costs. In contrast, vehicle types already provided in
sufficient number for all theaters (or which are of no use in a theater)
should evoke zero bids. This is because the commanders would attribute
no operational value at all to added vehicles of types which are either
already adequate to meet an output mission, or are not operationally suitable
Clearly, more of those vehicles for which the aggregate bid is
greater than its cost should be provided, and no vehicle receiving a
zero bid should be procured. An optimal solution results only when
vehicle and ship operational value bids have been completely imputed in
the central dual to the cost vectors C, and Q. .
In the optimal solution of the force level problem, a desirable
property would obviously be convergence of the values imputed by the
planner (solution of the central dual) and the bids attributed by the
separate commanders to the resource vectors Q and Q„. Fortunately,
the decomposition algorithmexhibits precisely this property.
If a vehicle force is appropriately selected, it should be
possible to induce theater commanders to choose bids which insure that
the cost constraints of the central dual are not exceeded.
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Suppose that solutions to the value/bid vectors of the central
dual are known; tt cp. , 9 i , i = l,2,...,m. The solution of these vectors
insures that the primal force level vectors are solved as well
Q.., Q 2 , X, , X 2 ,...,X . The force levels associated with the cost
constraints of the dual are the elements of these vectors. Presented
with these vectors of force levels_, the theater commanders should discover
that the value of their amphibious output mission (net value of the
amphibious force to the theater) -IOJ tt. - IQ' cp. + L! 6. is maximized,
1 1 2 Ti ii
This is the decomposition principle.
This exposition is analogous to that used in Edward S. Pearsall,
DECOMP - a FORTRAN Coded Subroutine for Solving Decomposable Linear
Programs
,
Institute for Defense Analyses Internal Note N-433(R),




The decentralized decision process formulated by the central
planner exploits the decomposable properties of the central dual program.
The terminal solution of the decomposition algorithm is, in fact,
mathematically optimal. It is the same optimal result which could be
obtained by solving the central dual as a straightforward linear program.
It is not this aspect of the process which engages the planner's attention,
however, (though it gives him confidence in the analytic procedure) as
much as it is the intermediate iterative exchange with the commanders
which leads to the optimal solution. The interchange takes place in a
way which is meaningful in terms of economic theory (most important to
the planner) and operational capabilities (first order business of the
theater commander)
.
Description of the Decision Process
It was shown earlier that the planner and the commander each
require information which can only be obtained from the other. In
particular, values of the resource vectors Q, and Q„ are (initially)
unknown to the commander. Similarly, the marginal operational values or
"bids" attributed by commanders to these resource vectors are needed by
the planner as he seeks a "mix" of vehicles and ships optimal over all
theaters. Suppose, in order to set the procedure in motion toward its







Q,, (L to the commanders. (The initial provisional vectors might
reasonably be solutions to the central primal program for the tactical
concept which is the present basis for amphibious force level objectives)
.
In return, the commanders are requested to relay bids which are
correlated with the resource vectors, each bid to express the potential
operational value measured at the margin, element by element, of an
added vehicle or ship to the ith theater.
The planner can reasonably expect something less than complete
satisfaction on the part of the commanders with the vehicle and ship levels
A *
postulated by the initial provisional vectors Q, and Q~. Suppose that
this is indeed the case. Bid levels are very high for some vehicles
and ships -- commanders are willing to bid handsomely for additional
units of these resources. For other ship and vehicle types bids are
low or zero -- either nearly enough are available to completely satisfy
theater output missions or the particular resource is of no use at all.
Further, bid reactions differ between theaters. One vehicle type may
receive a zero bid from one commander and a very high bid from another.
The vehicle is of no use in the first theater but is very effective in
the other. (The LARC-60 can contribute nothing to the output mission
of NOREUR, for example, because it cannot meet the minimum ship to
shore time /distance requirement, but is of some potential operational
value in other theaters ; the planner can anticipate a zero bid from
NOREUR for this vehicle from the outset)
.
As will be shown, the actual manner in which the theater commander
plans to employ the amphibious force is of no concern to the planner.
The only information required by the planner is the marginal value to




A last difficulty is that (1) the aggregate bid for additional
ships or vehicles of some types exceeds the per unit acquisition and
operating cost to the government of the vehicle or ship, and (2) the
aggregate bid for the remainder is less than the per unit cost (only
under the most fortunate circumstances could the planner expect aggregate
bid-cost equality)
.
The economic significance of these complications is not lost
on the planner. Another try is in order. The planner now attempts to
improve the operational desirability of his product by offering new
r \
provisional resource vectors Q, , CL which reflect higher levels in the
amphibious force of the ships and vehicles whose aggregate bids exceed
cost and less of those types which fall short. Again the theater
commanders respond. Hopefully, the aggregate bid -cost discrepancy will
be reduced. And this is how it turns out. As commanders see the
increased supply of desirable vehicles and ships their bids for these
elements will moderate. These adjustments make intuitive economic
sense. The ith commander will bid less at the margin for any vehicle
as the aggregate output capacity of that type approaches the ith theater
output mission.
The central planner now has two sets of bids, the second set an
improvement (from his bid -cost viewpoint) over the first.
The planner at this intermediate stage would presumably continue
to repeat the process until aggregate bid-cost equality is achieved.
Unfortunately, this happy result may not occur. The implied market
mechanism of the linear program may ultimately fail and the aggregate bids
either will not converge on the planner's cost vectors or will
converge for the wrong reasons. The difficulty lies in the fact
that no matter how the planner contorts the provisional resource
vectofe Q, , Q9 for some desirable vehicle and ship types, some commanders
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may persist in inflated bidding. This is because, in the market mechanism
employed by the planner, each commander will act to influence the
composition of the force in his own interests.
To see the effect of an inflated bid on succeeding resource
vectors offered by the planner, suppose that the ith commander considers
the SK-10 highly desirable and offers an (artificially) enormous jth




> CSK-10 (value °f the SK-10 exceeds its cost) . When thei=l
planner solves the central dual using this bid vector, the SK-10 element
of the next vector q, will reflect increased numbers of the SK-10, a
result clearly beneficial to the ith commander but not necessarily to
other commanders.
This type of (underhanded) activity by the ith commander is
obviously not in the best interests of other theaters. If not constrained,
the solution will produce an optimal force for the ith commander which
may be of limited value elsewhere. Coercion is implied and the planner
resorts to setting targets for the cost minimizing/force value maximizing
processes of the theaters. In subsequent iterations, provisional
resource vectors will be accompanied by value targets which have the
effect of forcing commanders to use resource vectors in a manner which
suits the planner T s purpose of aggregate optimality for the amphibious
force. As will be explained, the analytic procedure of the decision
process is formulated in such a way that the value of the
commander's bid is subtracted from the value of the amphibious force

34
(to the theater) . If the net value of the amphibious force to the
ith theater (bid values having been subtracted) falls short of the
value target, the bid is not accepted by the planner. In this fashion,
the value target prevents inflated bidding and forces correct use of
the planner's resource vectors.
The planner now uses the two bids held and later bids to
-\ A
generate succeeding provisional resource vectors Q, , Q„ and value
targets by forming weighted averages which are designed to improve the
(planner's) solution at each iteration.
The coercive process continues over a finite set of iterations until
optimal resource vectors Q, , Q„ are found. These optimal levels are
achieved when every commander exactly meets his target value. It is
entirely possible, even probable, that the amphibious force is not
optimal for each theater, but it is optimal from the planner's standpoint.
It is the minimum cost combination of vehicles and ships which can
accomplish the output mission in all theaters.
Analytic Framework of the Decision Process
The interchange of resource level-bid-target information just
described takes place within the analytic framework of the linear
program model developed in Chapter I with certain modifications which
will now be described.
A linear programming problem called the central master program
is formed based on the decomposition algorithm which will yield an
optimal weighted average of proposed theater amphibious force value
vectors subject to the constraint that the associated vehicle and
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and ship bid vectors do not exceed the central dual cost vectors C
and Cp. The central master primal program has three components:
(1) A weighted objective function derived from the
objective function of the original central dual
and similarly interpreted.
(2) Weighted bid -cost constraints of the central dual.
(3) Constraints on the (unknown) weights, one set
for each theater.
The central master primal problem . 2,3is : '
n i
Maximize: Z Z L! 9 . . ll . .
i=l 3=1 J
m n±
Subject to: Z Z tt. . \x. . < C,
1=1 j=l J
Z Z cp. • |i. • ^ C
1=1 3=1 J
ni
Z ix. . = 1 i=l,2,...,m
• i ID3=1
u. . > for all i and jPiD -
For a thorough description of the decomposition procedure applied
to a business firm see William J. Baumol and Tibor Fabian, "Decomposition,
Pricing, for Decentralization and External Economics", Journal of
Management Science
,
September 1964, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 1.
o





The identity matrix serves only to dimension the resource and
bid vectors in the linear program and has been dropped from the
formulation in this chapter for the purpose of reducing notational clutter,
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Where n. -number of proposals of the ith theater
|i..- the weights associated with the theater bid
and value vectors.
rr.
., 8. . - jth proposed vehicle and ship bid vectors
for the ith theater
6. . - jth proposed output mission (amphibious force)
value vector for the ith theater
i - 1,2, ... ,m
j - l,2,...,n i
and n. ., cp. . , 9 . . >
The weights ^ij are seen to be the only variables. This is because
the tt.
., cp. . and 9. . vectors are known values. They are, in fact,
current and all previous bids submitted by the theater commanders.
At any intermediate stage of the process then, the only true unknowns
are the weights. The object of the central master program is the
determination of a set of feasible weights \x .,correlated with the
latest and earlier bids offered up by the theater commanders. The
calculation of the next set of weights will yield a higher valued
(lower cost) amphibious force.
The central master program formed by the planner does not
include the vehicle output value constraint E! 8. < P.+ K'rr. + F'cp.
1 1 — 1 1 Ti
of the original central dual. That is, all information concerning
vehicle performance in a particular theater is ignored by the
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planner. The planner evidently intends to leave operational matters
in the hands of the operational commanders. And this is indeed the
case. The planner has taken advantage of the property of the
decomposable linear program which permits the commander to employ the
amphibious force in any manner most effective in his theater without
2
recourse to the planner concerning these purely operational matters.
Such generous behavior by the planner is possible because the same
constraint appears in the theater dual derived in Chapter I ( p. 26 ).
The way in which this constraint is accommodated, however, is left
to the commander as will be explained in the next section.
The Decomposition Procedure in the Decision Process
During intermediate stages of the planner-commander interchange
the values of the weights \±. . are disregarded. The purpose of solving
the central master program is instead the generation of new provisional
resource vectors Q, and Q_.
Solution of the dual of the central master yields the resource vector
information needed for the next iteration of bids. The central master
dual is formed
:
This statement is not completely accurate in that planner-
commander coordination external to the analytic process is necessary
in the determination of expected attrition costs . Probability and
attrition rate inputs to these costs must be agreed upon and fixed.
Otherwise, commanders (very close to the threat) could escalate these
values unreasonably and thereby inflate requirements (see Appendix 3
for derivation of expected attrition costs)
.






Minimize: C Q + C 1 Q« + E
i=l
A
Subject to: tt! . Q n + cp! . Qn + 4. > (L'9..) f for all i and jJ 11 1 Yn 2 T i — v n J
A
where Q, - a vector of provisional vehicle levels
Q„ - a vector of provisional ship levels
i|r,
, typ , . . . , \)r - a planning target which measures the
marginal increase in aggregate value
of the amphibious force over all theaters
resulting from a unit increase in net
value of the force to the ith theater.
The role of the planning target
ty
is a coercive one and its
interpretation will perhaps be better understood after a review of the
bid -generating activity of the theater commander. Recall that the ith
commander formulated his theater primal subproblem:
It was pointed out earlier that probability and attrition values
used in computing expected attrition costs P. must be coordinated out-
side the analytic process. Theater commanders, however, are not
likely to view the probability of amphibious operations with quite
the same detachment as the planner. An alternative procedure could be
adopted which would partially resolve this difficulty in a way which
may be useful to the planner in deciding on relative priorities
between theaters. The coordination problem can, in fact, be finessed
completely by permitting commanders to participate in the bidding
procedure as if the prospect of an operation in each theater were
certain, i.e. compute expected attrition costs using unit values of
probability. The planner can retain judgment at his (national) level
as to the relative probability of operations (and hence priorities)
among the various theaters. To see why this is so, consider the ith
theater subproblem after the jth bid:
-K T n -F T i + L.T 5. .= P! X.
ij ij i id i i
The duality theorem states that the (maximized) net value of the
amphibious force in the ith theater exactly equals its (minimized)
expected attrition cost. But expected attrition cost P. is a linear
function of the probability of an amphibious operation in the ith theater
(see Appendix 3). Since K, F and L. are constants and P.X. is also a
linear function of probability, the planner can legitimately scale the
theater bids by any values he may choose, to reflect the relative priority




Subject to: K X. £ Q
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i = 1,2, ... ,m
Theater Dual Variable
TT
F X. £ Q2 cp.
E. X. :> L.li—i
Solution of this linear program using any provisional resource
vectors Q, , Q will produce the theater bid vectors n. ., cp. ., 0. . for1 2 13' rij' 13
the next bid submission to the central planner (as explained in
Chapter I, page 26).
The planning target ty. is associated with the weight constraint
ni
X
I p. . = 1 of the central master program. This constraint serves to
j=l ID
require that the variables of the primal program are true averages of
the ith theater bids (I rr. (j,., j = l,...,n., for example). \|r. must
be interpreted as the marginal value to the planner of a 100% increase
(doubling the weighted average of the theater bid) in the net value of the
amphibious force operating in the ith theater. Thus it is the marginal
increase in aggregate value of the amphibious force to the planner
which results from a shift of the output potential of the force in the
interests of the ith theater (include 'more of the ships and vehicles for
which the ith commander is bidding) . The target iji is used by the planner
to insure that commander s "play the game", i.e. generate legitimate bids
s* A





To see how the target operates consider again the dual of the ith
theater primal:
Maximize: -Q' n. -Q' cp.+L'G. j = l,2,...,n
1
Subject to: 1 E'9. < P + K t tt. + F'cp. j = 1.2,. ...n.
3 - 3 3 ' ' i
The theater commander solves the dual to obtain the next bid but before
he sends the vectors forward he must pe form a test using the value target
\ji.. Now the target
\J<
is significant to the commander because it is, in
effect, the net value of his objective function (net value of the amphibious
force in his theater) for the previous iteration of bids. This is so
because i|j. is the value to the planner of a 100% increase in net value
A A - A _ -
in the ith theater. Hence \li = -Q' tt. -Ql cp. + LJ 0.. The test is
^1 3 ^2 ^j 1 j
A
— A | _
\L j+1 "^2 ^j+1 + L' 0. , ^ f. That is, in the succeeding round of
bidding, the commander must at least achieve the previous net value of his
maximized dual objective function. This comparison forces the commander to
choose bid values (avoid inflated bids) such that the total value of the
amphibious force in his theater exceeds the total amount he is willing
to bid for his potential use of the amphibious force by at least the target
value (which he attained in the previous iteration) . If he attempts to
cheat by inflating bids artificially to influence the force composition in
his favor, the (negative) effect of such a bid will cause him to fall short
2
of the target and his bid will not be accepted by the planner. After the
comparison is successfully made, the commander forwards the new bid
vectors to the planner.
The theater dual includes the "missing" constraint of the original
central dual
5 which was excluded from the central master program.
2Similarly, if the commander submits artificially reduced bids, he
foregoes his opportunity to influence the composition of the force (relative to






The planner -commander dialogue is not an endless interchange.
After a finite number of iterations, the process terminates in an
optimal solution. The target vector \|z is used by the planner to
identify the point at which this solution occurs. At some stage of the
process, the planner will have a set of proposed bid and value vectors
which do not violate theater cost constraints and which exceed or at
least meet the previous target i|r.. (If this is not the case in any
theater, the planner recommends retirement for the commander). Suppose
that after j bid proposals, m - 1 commanders have just met their targets
2 -Q T tt. . - Q' cp. . + L! 9. • = *.
i=1 x ID 2
Yij i 13 y i
and that the ith commander has exceeded his target
The amount by which the ith commander has exceeded his target
has been shown to be a measure of the marginal increase in the
aggregate value of the amphibious force which the ith commanders jth
bid proposal offers the planner. The planner will gain by revising
the composition of the force according to the pattern recommended by
the ith commander by incorporating his jth proposal and recomputing
the central master program:
Iterations are continued until all targets are exactly met.
At this poin^ optimality criteria are satisfied:





(1) All theaters have just met their value targets -
- Q-! ' tt.
.
- QA cp. . + L ! 5 . . = i . for all i and j ; and1 13 2 Ti D 1 13 Y i J '
(2) Aggregate bid -cost equality is achieved -
m m
E n. = C
n
and £ cp. = C„
1=1 1=1
The central master is then solved for the optimal weights
la,? . j = l,2,...,n. which simultaneously yield optimal resource
vectors Q, and Q„ (via the dual of the central master)
.
No adjustment in composition will increase the aggregate value
of the amphibious force (reduce its cost) and the value of the force
is maximized (expected attrition cost minimized) . The force composition
Q,
, Q9 to be recommended for acquisition has been identified and the
decision process is complete.
Solution of the theater primal programs, using the resource
vectors Q° ,Q„ will yield optimal theater vehicle employment vectors
X'l
,
i=l,2,...,m as well. It is emphasized, however, that this is a
mathematical result only. The vehicle and ship levels reflected in
the optimal solution are imposed on the commanders. They must plan
for future operations based on the "mix" selected by the planner




The central planner is now prepared to summarize the results of the
cooperative decision process in the form of amphibious force level
objectives to be recommended. The decomposable linear program has
been solved using known investment and operating cost information and
successive bids generated by theater commanders. The commanders in
the process have taken account of the operational effectiveness of the
amphibious force to be recommended and found it to be adequate.
Results
Tabulated below are the amphibious force objectives yielded as
optimal solutions for the vectors Q, and Q„.
The decomposable linear program model was programmed and run
on a CDC 1604 computer using the DECOMP subroutine previously cited

















SEASIA MIDEAST NOREUR CI 3




LVTX Tt 600 300 600 600 N/A





LPH (7) 14 14 6 10 7
LPD (16) 16 14 5 16 12
LSD (5) 24 2 24 24 2
LST (18) 18 18
Inspection of this table provides an insight into the cost
minimizing/value maximizing process of the linear program. The results
are intuitively satisfying from both the planner's (cost) and the
commander's (operational) viewpoint. For example:
1Force to be recommended.
Figures in parentheses adjacent to ship classes are the levels
available before 1970 treated as sunk costs in the analysis.




1. All theater output missions can be accomplished by the
force selected.
2. No overall dominance is exhibited in the theater
employment levels. NOREUR dominates MIDEAST and CI,
but not SEASIA. MIDEAST and SEASIA dominate only CI.
3. The LSD is the most attractive ship because it is an
efficient carrier of the SK-10, the vehicle selected
to perform the entire "general amphibious" output
mission. Since add-on LSD's were needed for NOREUR,
it is cheaper to use some of these added ships in
MIDEAST to embark SK-10 f s and LVTX's than some of the
LPD's and all of the LST's already in the force by 1970.
4. No additional LPD's or LST's are included in the solution
and LST's are used only after all LPD's are employed in
NOREUR. The linear program has used all available ship
assets before "buying" additional ships (LSD's and LPH's).
5. Although the SK-10 is relatively expensive (exceeded only
by the LCU which has been penalized for its non-amphibious
characteristics), its superior performance dominates the
general amphibious output mission.
Vehicle/Ship Employment
The way in which the vehicle force is embarked in the ships in
different theaters is provided by the solutions of the theater





Comp'tble Output SEASIA MIDEAST NOREUR CI
Ship Vehicle Mission Veh Ship Veh Ship Veh Ship Veh Ship








CH53 (0) 17 6 12 10
LPD LVTX Armored
Amphib. 300 6




SK-10 Gen. Amphib. 2 43 24 55 24 2
SK-10 (0) 7 23 38 8
LST LVTX Armored
Amphib. 594 18
(0) indicates that the vehicle performs also in the outsize




To see how all this comes about and to show that the decentralized
decision process has, in fact, produced an optimal solution, recall the
optimality criteria that: (1) theater commanders just meet operational
value planning targets and (2) the aggregate bid (operational value)
2
equals per unit investment and operating costs.
TABLE XII
FORCE VALUE PLANNING TARGET EQUALITY
Theater Net Central Master
Theater Force Value Planning Target
SEASIA 37.1913 37.191
MIDEAST 17.2466 17.247
NOREUR 25.1052 25.10 5
CI 13.6801 13.680
Table XII shows that commanders have exactly met the planning target
generated by the solution of the dual of the central master program
after the last round of bidding. This result assures the planner that
no change in the composition of the force will improve its aggregate
value (reduce its cost), and hence no repetition of the bidding process
is required and an optimal solution has been determined.
It is emphasized that the entire linear program problem was
solved in an iterative process by one computer. The computer used
14 successive solutions of the central master program and the theater
subproblems to yield the optimal result. This is a property of the
decomposition algorithm. The theater subproblem, however, can be
extracted from the computer program, and the central master will accept
bid information computed externally, subsequently providing the required
resource vectors and targets for the next iteration. That is, the
theater subproblem can be solved in the theater.
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MIDEAST NOREUE CI c£,q°
2
CH53 4.2 340
CH46 2.80 2.80 < 2.835
LVTP .0388 .3357 .0017 .3762 < .378
LVTX .2446 .0288 .2734
~
.273 600
SK-10 6.030 6.03 = 6.03 124
LCA .650 .650 < .652
LARC-60 .725 .0047 .7297 < .733
LCU 1.467 5.790 .0266 7.2836 < 7.285
LCM-8 .0413 1.857 .0063 1.9046 < 1.905
LPH 79.31 79.31 = 79.31 7
LPD .0020 34.15 34.1520 < 79.82
LSD .0068 66.45 .0073 66.464
~
66.45 19
LST .0068 16.62 16.6268 < 46.77
These results reflect additional properties desired by the planner in
the optimal solution. The sum of the bids for six vehicle types and
two ship classes are less than related per unit investment and operating
The solution, which does not "buy" LPD's or LST T s,is partially
misleading from an operational standpoint. This is because these ships
function in other missions not considered by the analysis. The LST, for
example, is required for its beaching capabilities to land large numbers
of tracked and wheeled vehicles of the landing force quickly. The LPD
is a major troop transport and also operates helicopters. An alternative
procedure could be to include the LST as a competitor in the "general
amphibious" output mission (although these ships are not normally
employed in the very early stages of the assault)
.
2
Less ships whose costs are treated as sunk.
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costs and no additions of these vehicles and ships were recommended in
the optimal solution
.
Similarly, all vehicles and ships reflecting
aggregate bids equal to cost were recommended in sufficient quantity.
Two interesting points can be made from the table:
1. SEASIA (the largest helicopter user) is bidding at the
margin the entire cost of the LPH and the CH53; all other
theaters having long been satisfied as is seen in Table X.
2. NOREUR (the heaviest user of general amphibious vehicles)
is bidding the entire cost of the SK-10 and LSD while still
offering (low) bids for LPD's and LST's and some general
amphibious vehicles. Clearly, the LSD/SK-10 combination
is preferred.
Solution by Individual Theater
In order to investigate the effect of optimizing the amphibious
force for one theater (plan) only, the model was solved for each theater
individually (3 theaters deleted). Table XIV below compares the results





COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL AND COMBINED SOLUTIONS
(Individual/Combined)
Vehicle/
Ship SEASIA MIDEAST NOREUR CI
CH53 340/340 132/132 241/241 166/166
CH46 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
LVTP 139/0 0/0 0/0 N/A
LVTX 105/300 600/600 600/600 N/A
SK-10 0/27 76/76 124/124 0/32
LCA 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
LARC-60 98/0 0/0 0/0 89/0
LCU 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
LCM-8 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
LPH 14/14 6/6 10/10 7/7
LPD 16/] 4 16/5 16/16 16/12
LSD 5/2 2/24 24/24 3/2
LST 18/0 18/0 18/18 0/0
Examination of the table shows that, except for NOREUR, the forces are
different between the individual and combined cases. The table provides
some useful information:
1. In the individual case the theaters with the lesser general
amphibious output missions used vehicles of lesser performance
capability. SEASIA and CI used the LARC-60, the least
productive but also the vehicle with the highest output/cost
ratio. (This result is easily justified when it is recalled
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that sufficient time (4 hours) is available in the SEASIA
and CI tactical plans for this vehicle to accomplish the
general amphibious mission in these theaters) . In the
combined case, the need for SK-10's in MIDEAST and NOREUR
forced use of this vehicle in SEASIA and CI in lieu of the
LARC-60.
2. The inter-theater effects of the combined solution are quite
apparent with respect to ships also. When theater plans
are solved individually, available LPD T s and LST's are used
completely and no add-on LSD's are employed in SEASIA,
MIDEAST or CI. (The NOREUR requirement exceeds this
capacity and "buys" LSD's as expected). In the combined
solution, however, it is less costly to use add-on LSD's
in MIDEAST to substitute for some LPD's and all LST's.
Sensitivity Check
The most sensitive aspect of the costing procedure is the influence
of the values asserted as the probability of the various theater
contingencies arising. Expected attrition costs P. i = 1,...,4 are
linear functions of probability (see Appendix 3). In order to test
the effects of changes in these values (and, incidentally, to test for
possible complete dominance of the solution by the NOREUR tactical plan)
,
the problem was solved in 5 increments which bracketed the probability
assigned NOREUR in the basic combined solution (.05) as follows:
.02 -» .04 _>.06 -^ .08 -> .10
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These changes in probability of operation in NOREUR produced no change
in the overall force structure. The effect was simply to raise total
costs by an increment of $16.7 million dollars. Acquisition costs
of investment and operation clearly dominate the solution in this
probability range.
Force Level Implications of Results
The foregoing results suggest that optimizing the amphibious force
for one tactical plan (one set of parameters) will not yield a force
which is optimal over a range of possible contingencies. Table XIV
shows, in fact, that radically different forces are required to meet
theater contingencies taken individually (one amphibious force per





Contrast of Model Interpretations and Interactions
The present application of the decomposition process to
decentralized decision-making depends upon an interpretation very
different from that commonly given in the literature to decomposable
linear program structures. The interaction between the problem of the
planner and the subproblem of the commander takes place in a way
precisely opposite that of the usual firm-subdivision dialogue. The
usefulness of the decomposition process is customarily demonstrated in
a setting in which the firm desires to allocate firm-wide resources to
subdivisions in a manner which will insure that subdivision activities
are operated at levels which achieve some pre -determined goal of the
firm at minimum cost. In contrast, the decomposable model suggested
in this paper is directed toward attainment of the goals of subordinate
elements at minimum cost. The motivation attributed to the central
authority in this context is one of developing an optimal resource
structure which will, when required, provide an operational capability
to any subordinate element adequate to accomplish the element mission.
The iterative process emphasizes value at the point of use.
It does this by permitting the resource consumer (commander) to
influence the product of the resource supplier (planner) . The




planner-commander relationship is seen to be the reverse of the
ordinary practice in which the firm (ultimately) dictates the product
of the firm's subdivisions. In the present case, resource levels
are proferred to the commanders who then determine the relative
effectiveness of the different resource elements (to the commander)
and respond with bids which measure marginal operational value. The
aggregate commander bid reaction thus (in the optimal solution)
dictates product levels to be adopted by the planner via the implied
market mechanism of the linear program. The influence of the planner
is used in coordinating the bidding process to insure that the
aggregate bid yields a minimum cost force which is optimal from a
comprehensive viewpoint , .i .e . it is the minimum cost force which can
perform the mission in all theaters. The result is entirely plausible
from an economic viewpoint. At the optimal solution, bids for the
amphibious force accepted by the planner (aggregate operational value
of the force) exactly equal its per unit cost (an outcome analogous
to the interaction of supply and demand forces in a market impelled
toward equilibrium}.
Usefulness of Present Procedures
The present procedure for determining amphibious force levels
assumes that one general tactical plan is adequate for the development
of future force objectives. The solution suggests that this procedure
is questionable at best. Each of the four theaters included in the
analysis required a different mix (individually or collectively).
Further, no force developed for one theater could accomplish the
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output mission of each of the others within the parameters established
by the theater commanders. The one-plan approach to determination
of ship and vehicle requirements does not appear to be a sound basis
for future programming of amphibious force levels.
General Applicability of the Decentralized Decision Process
The analytic elements of a force level problem set out in this
paper are the same inputs which are used in many of the programming
procedures of the Department of Defense. Decisions are, in fact, made
within the Department based on an information flow which is similar
to the planner-commander dialogue postulated. The Secretary of Defense
and the Service and joint components of the Department generate and
evaluate force level proposals at least annually. The process requires
an enormous negotiating effort -- some of it analytical, but much of
it verbal and subject to interpretation.
The decision process suggested can substitute an analytic
technique, rigorously supported by mathematical and economic theory,
for at least some portion of the procedure which relies on semantics
and subjective judgment (experience) . The planner-commander dialogue
of the decomposition process provides for explicit expression of
operational value and cost criteria in terms which are not open to
interpretation in the sense that there is no doubt about what is
meant (by a zero bid, for example) or how much .
Improvement and Expansion of the Model
The simple model developed clearly could not function as an
instrument for decision-making in its present form. It should (and
can) be improved by adjustment to accommodate other characteristics
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of amphibious resources and operations which bear on the overall
effectiveness of the amphibious force. The most critical deficiency
in the model is that it does not account for the embarkation require-
ments of the Marine landing force in an explicit fashion. Ships are
generated only to accommodate the ship-to-shore vehicle force. It
turns out that these ships are probably adequate to embark the initial
assault elements of the landing force with substantial residual
capacity remaining, but this result is by default. The model should
be improved to accommodate vehicle force/landing force embarkation
inter-action precisely.
The model can easily be extended to include such additional
performance considerations as vehicle cross-country mobility,
endurance, service life, and so forth.
Additional Uses of the Model
It its present form, the decomposable model exhibits other
properties useful to the central defense planner which permit analysis
of the effect of change in elements other than the variables of the
program. The coefficients are subject to parametric variation, for
example. This feature of the model permits the planner (or commander)
to explore the impact on the force structure of changes in attrition,
investment and operating costs, vehicle output capacities and so on.
Another revealing aspect of a parametric analysis would be the
examination of the effect of changes in output missions (requirements).
It is these output requirements which dictate total costs. If
requirements were not approved (as assumed) the planner could present
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efficient alternative force structures and costs derived from such
an examination (leaving to the policy-maker the decision as to the
optimal force structure to be adopted)
.
The model can be adjusted to reflect shifts in the strategic environment
and related priorities. This is accomplished by changing the relative
probabilities of conducting operations among theater (scaling commander's
bids) . As the probability of an operation in any theater increases
(other remaining fixed) so does the relative influence of the theater on
the composition of the force, and hence its priority is in effect increased.
Summary
The decomposable model constructed in this paper is believed
applicable in general to solution of force level problems which include
basic ingredients of (1) operational capability to meet (2) a range
of requirements at (3) minimum cost. It is a device for cooperative
decision-making which can assist in insuring that the (minimum cost)
force structure decided upon is completely feasible from an operational
point of view because it places in the hands of the responsible user an
analytic means for making his views known with certainty to the decision-maker,

APPENDIX 1
THEATER CHARACTERISTICS AND TACTICAL PLANS
In order to determine the composition of a force of amphibious
vehicles and ships suitable for use over probable contingencies, the
military planner must consider the effects on amphibious warfare of:
(1) differences in the operational environment between geographical
regions, and (2) probable opposition in each region. Most of the
probable requirements for large-scale amphibious operations can be
placed in one of the three types of contingencies according to the
dominant terrain of the area: jungle, desert, and cultivated/
industrial.
For purposes of visualizing and subsequently evaluating the
relative influence of different regional environments on the desired
amphibious force, four operational theater contingencies which require
U.S. preparedness for amphibious assault operations are postulated:
(1) Southeast Asian theater (jungle)
(2) Middle Eastern theater (desert)
(3) Northern European theater (cultivated/industrial)
(4) Counterinsurgency
Each of the theaters exhibits certain operational characteristics which
influence both the type of Marine force to be landed, and the way in
which it is desired to land that force. Primary factors which affect
tactical planning for each area are:




(1) The sea approaches and beach configuration
in the objective area.
(2) The terrain in which the Marine landing force
will operate.
(3) The amount and quality of probable enemy opposition.
In the discussion which follows, it is assumed that the amphibious
assault is delivered from a Naval amphibious task force composed of
Naval amphibious ships and vehicles and a Marine landing force of
combined arms, air and ground. It is further assumed that the landings
are opposed and occur in circumstances of active combat.
Southeast Asian Theater (SEASIA)
Consider first the amphibious environment of the SEASIA theater.
Open sea approaches to probable objective areas in this region of the
world are relatively unrestricted and ample sea maneuver room is
available. In addition, opposition to the seaward activities of the
amphibious assault is not expected, since no significant opposing
Naval force exists in this area. Many beaches suitable for landing
amphibious vehicles are available, although major difficulty is
presented by the limited water depth of the close-in approaches to
the land. Gradually shoaling waters surrounding the beaches have the
effect of forcing the amphibious ships to launch assault vehicles
from distances well out to sea, often 10 miles or more. The terrain
in which the landing force must operate is largely thick jungle, with
very few roads, and is impassable to heavy military vehicles. Clearings
resulting from crop cultivation are frequent in the jungle canopy,
however. The characteristic lack of ground mobility in this theater
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and the availability of clearings dictate primary reliance on the
helicopter for tactical maneuver. With respect to the third factor
listed above, armed forces in this region of the world consist mainly
of large infantry formations which characteristically conduct a mobile
defense taking advantage of the jungle canopy, but offering little
initial opposition in the beach area. These types of forces can
successfully be taken under attack by helicopterborne Marine forces
supported by tactical aviation (a capability not found in armed forces
of SEASIA)
.
Middle Eastern Theater (MIDEAST)
Conditions for amphibious assault in the MIDEAST theater are in
direct contrast to those of SEASIA. Here open sea approaches are
more restricted, and available sea maneuvering space reduced in the
Mediterranean, Red, and Arabian Seas. Although Naval forces in this
region are limited and pose no important threat to the task force at
sea, the presence of substantial tactical aviation opposition coupled
with more restricted sea space requires the amphibious task force to
launch the assault from greater distances, enabling the task force to
maneuver evasively, if required. Numerous beaches are available, and
the close-in approaches more suitable for deep-draft amphibious ships
than those of SEASIA. Ground mobility for the heavy tracked vehicles
of the Marine landing force is unlimited. The type of opposition to
be expected in MIDEAST influences the composition of the landing force
to a greater extent than in SEASIA. In this instance, light helicopter-
borne forces are less effective against the armored formations of
nations in this area than against the infantry forces typical of SEASIA,
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Further, the significant tactical aviation capabilities of some
Middle Eastern nations reduces the utility of the helicopter. There
is also some possibility of a requirement for direct assault over
beaches defended by mines, obstacles and entrenched forces.
The amphibious environment in the MIDEAST theater thus suggests
emphasis on a capability to land Marine forces which include
substantial armored amphibian, tank and artillery capability with a
derivitive requirement for an amphibious force able to land the heavy
units characteristically employed in desert warfare.
Northern European Theater (NOREUR)
Amphibious operations in the NOREUR theater are the most difficult
of all four postulated contingencies. Here available beaches are
severely limited. Maneuver space in the North Sea is greatly reduced
in comparison to the other theaters. Substantial Naval as well as
tactical aviation opposition can be expected at sea. These conditions
require that the assault be launched at maximum possible distance in
a minimum time period to permit the Naval task force to maneuver to
protect itself while continuing to support the Marine landing force
ashore. Heavily armored forces can be anticipated in probable
objective areas, supported by powerful tactical aviation elements.
A further complication, not exhibited in the MIDEAST or SEASIA
theaters is the probability of entrenched beach defenses protected by
extensive water and land mine fields and other obstacles. Armored
amphibians must be provided in adequate numbers for direct assault of
these defended beaches. The Marine landing force must be heavily
weighted by added tank and artillery units for landings in this region.
Because of the probability of strong beach defenses, a capability




to avoid shore areas must also be retained. In amphibious assault
operations the employment of helicopterborne forces which can overfly
or flank defended beaches provides the tactical flexibility needed to
reduce the effectiveness of enemy opposition in the beach area. As a
consequence of the quality of the expected enemy in Northern Europe,
in combination with a propensity to defend at the beach, the conduct
of amphibious assaults in Northern Europe requires the availability
of both helicopter and heavy surface assault capabilities in the
amphibious force.
Counterinsurgency (CI)
The preceding theater contingencies are related to geographical
areas and are presumed to require preparedness for landing under
circumstances of conventional combat. There is one type of requirement
for amphibious operations not provided for in these contingencies,
however, which has a very high probability of occurrence. The need
for an amphibious force capable of dealing effectively with problems
of insurgency during the period 1970-1979 can be anticipated. Because
of the many areas in which insurgency might arise, it does not seem
reasonable to relate such a requirement to a single geographical area
(theater) . The multitude of possible types of insurgency would also
appear to be prohibitive for analysis. Rather, a single, generalized
counterinsurgency theater is postulated for the purpose of identifying
requirements for e wide range of operations in such an environment.
Military counterinsurgency operations encompass a very broad spectrum
of military activity ranging from quelling civil disturbance to defeating
highly organized compaigns of terror, sabotage and subversion.
Situations of this kind do not require the firepower of the ordinary
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Marine landing force which is capable of breaching established
defenses or destroying heavy armored units. Indeed, the need is for
a far less obtrusive force which can do the job with dispatch and be
withdrawn as quickly as it is landed when local forces are able to
resume control.
The composition of a counterinsurgency force emphasizes mobility
and capabilities for quick reaction, occupation of many locations
simultaneously, rapid communications, and effective intelligence.
The helicopter is the most useful means for providing light, fast-moving
units which exhibit these characteristics. Concerning the ship-to-shore
movement, the most important factors are the ability of the force to
seize key locations over a large area, and to establish an effective
base of operations for command and control and logistic support ashore,
all in a short period of time. Armored amphibian vehicles, thoujh
useful in counterinsurgency operations, are not required in the sense
of assault under conditions of active combat. In this context, the
amphibious operation is not an assault, but a rapid deployment ashore
of forces preponderantly infantry in nature. Probable insurgency
develops a requirement for a substantial helicopterborne capability
with a greatly reduced need for an amphibious force capable of rapidly
delivering all of the heavy firepower and logistic support elements
of the normal Marine landing force. The surface portion of the ship-
to-shore movement in the counterinsurgency environment is devoted
primarily to quick and efficient off-loading of logistic and headquarters
units and supplies with only small security forces normally required in
advance. Further, ship-to-shore distances are typically reduced, and
requirements for security at sea correspondingly small.

64
Representative Theater Tactical Plans
The foregoing comparison of the factors influencing the conduct
of amphibious operations in the four scenarios furnishes the necessary
background for development of representative tactical plans which
permit translation of the theater requirement for an assault capability
into terms of specific forces which can be measured and evaluated for
purposes of operational and economic analysis. These tactical plans
are the output mission requirements to be used by the central planner
in the force level decision-making process.
Tactical planning to accomplish the mission of an amphibious
operation includes: (1) the selection of physical military objectives
to be seized or destroyed, such as terrain features and enemy forces
and installations which are identifiable on the ground; (2) the
determination of the composition of the Marine landing force necessary
to achieve these objectives; and (3) the means and timing of delivering
the landing force to accomplish the mission. Although many other
factors must be considered in amphibious planning, the purpose of the
present analysis is served by developing those elements of the tactical
plan related directly to the ship-to-shore movement which require
answers to the following questions
:
(1) How shall the landing force be structured (organization,
number of troops, types of equipment, supplies)?
(2) How shall the elements of the landing force be landed?
(3) How much time is available for the ship-to-shore
movement and over what distances must the landing
force be transported to the selected military
objectives?
(4) What are the lift requirements of the separate
tactical elements of the landing force?
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A Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) , varying in size and
composition according to the most probable conditions anticipated in
each theater, is selected in this analysis as the landing force to be
launched from amphibious assault ships of the Navy. The MEF is a
flexible task organization which normally includes a Marine Division
and a Marine Air Wing, together with other reinforcing elements.
Different landing force requirements for varying contingencies are
accommodated by adding or subtracting units from the MEF. For example,
additional tank units can be added, or helicopter units subtracted,
depending on the particular situation.
The major maneuver elements of the Marine Expeditionary Force
are the Regimental Landing Teams (RLT) which vary for the same reasons
in size and composition. A helicopterborne RLT is smaller, and
substantially ligher than the surfaceborne RLT, for example. An MEF
ordinarily contains three RLT's. The representative tactical plan for
each of the four theaters is expressed in terms of the means by which
these RLT's are to be landed and the probable conditions of distance
and time which are the minimum acceptable to ensure an effective assault
capability for the probable theater contingency, and accordingly
represent maximum output mission requirements.
Table I below contains a summary of pertinent characteristics
of each theater as described above and presents tactical aspects of
the plans which reflect the differences identified in the operational
environments and Marine landing force composition among the four
theaters
.
There are, of course, an infinity of possible plans for each
theater. Tactical plans are as varied as those who draft them.
Those postulated in Table I are intended to highlight relative
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The Tactical Planning Process and Determination of Output Mission Lift
Requirements
Output mission lift requirements to be met by the amphibious force
are extracted from the representative tactical plans of the four
theater commanders (SEASIA, MIDEAST, NOREUR and CI) and are presented
separately from other output mission parameters. This is done for
the purpose of describing the planning process in general terms.
Tactical Planning
Tactical planning is done by each theater commander in a series
of interdependent steps which are influenced by the mission assigned
and the factors of expected enemy opposition, terrain, and beach and
sea conditions described above.
First, military objectives are selected (terrain features,
enemy forces) ashore which will provide for accomplishment of the overall
landing force mission to seize the force beachhead. At this time,
a general estimate is made of the overall size and type of landing
force needed to accomplish the amphibious assault as well as subsequent
operations. Next a scheme of maneuver is prepared which describes how
and by what elements of the landing force these objectives will be
attacked. The scheme of maneuver thus designates military objectives
for the major maneuvering elements of the MEF and also directs at
what time and how these elements will land: by helicopter, or
armored amphibian vehicle. The evaluation of the size of the force
needed is then refined and a task organization specified which





Tactical planning decisions are now made as to how and when the
remainder of the MEF is to be landed. This portion of the landing
force is substantially larger than the RLT's and includes major
heavy fire support and logistic and administrative elements. Part of
this remainder must be landed by general amphibious vehicles (other
than armored amphibians) -- heavy fire support units such as tanks
and artillery are characteristic of this assault requirement. The rest
of the landing force is generally landed by any means available (except
armored amphibians which remain ashore) during a time period of 3-7 days
To summarize the tactical planning sequence:
First -- military objectives to accomplish the overall
mission of the landing force are selected.
Second -- a scheme of maneuver is prepared, the landing
force task organized for the attack, and
missions assigned to the task organized
elements, including objectives, times and
means of assault.
Third -- decisions are made as to how and when the
remainder of the MEF will land.
The fourth and final step is to quantify the requirements
generated by the planning sequence and assign output missions to the
amphibious force for the execution of the ship-to-shore movement which
is integrated with and directly supports the landing force scheme of
maneuver and the related task organization. (Those aspects of the
output mission imposed by the tactical plan which are related to
time, distance, and means of assault are shown in Table I).

69
Determination of the Output Mission
Time and distance parameters are correlated with the physical
size and weight of the men, equipment and supplies comprising the
separate task elements to be delivered ashore. The magnitude of the
total demand placed on the amphibious force is determined completely
when the tonnages to be lifted in each output mission are identified.
Landing force output mission tonnages can be seen to fall in four
categories which are derived directly from the planning decisions of
the commander.
1. Helicopterborne assault RLT's
2. Armored amphibious assault RLT's
3. Combat support forces not a part of the RLT T s which
are transported by general amphibious vehicle means
4. The remainder of the MEF which is unrestricted as to
the type of surface vehicle required.
Table II contains the lift requirements (in short tons) for each
theater in each output mission and reflects the differently configured
landing forces required in each instance. In the table, the tonnages
for the separate output missions which identify the tasks of the
amphibious assault vehicle force are listed for the SEASIA theater.
A multiple is then assigned in each category for the other three
theaters to reflect the differences in composition among the four
forces. For example, for NOREUR the table shows the basic SEASIA
MEF reinforced by one RLT (for a total of 4) and additional tank, and
This output mission is not considered by the analysis but is
shown for its explanatory value in the description of the overall MEF
lift requirement (see Footnote 3, Table II).
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other heavy fire support units needed to initiate combat on the
European mainland. Similarly, the reduced helicopter requirements for
the MIDEAST scenario are reflected by a multiple of \ of the SEASIA
requirement
.
The output mission requirements, Table II, constitute the elements
of the theater requirement vectors L., i = 1,...,4.
Estimates in Table II for weight requirements are generally
based on unclassified planning factors contained in Marine Corps Schools
planning exercize "Apex" conducted in May-June 1967. Although the
estimates are believed generally representative, no pretense is held
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Outsize tonnages are the summed weights of individual lifts
which exceed the capability of at least one of the candidate vehicles
in any output mission. Unlimited tonnages can be embarked by any
candidate vehicle operated in a particular output, mission.
2
Initial assault output mission lift requirements (incl. troops).
3
This portion of the output mission is not included in the analysis.
Earlier computer solutions of the linear program revealed that the initial
assault output mission for general amphibious vehicles (which must be
metbefore the unrestr. output mission) produced more vehicles than
necessary for the unrestricted mission by several orders of magnitude.

APPENDIX 2
AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE AND SHIP VECTOR DESCRIPTION
Resource Vectors
The analysis is directed toward solution of the vectors Q, (vehicles)
and Q„ (ships). Tables III and IV identify the composition of these
vectors by individual vector element and describe the general
characteristics of the corresponding candidate vehicles and ships.
Capabilities of the vehicles and ships are listed in Tables VIII and IX,
Appendix 4. Costs are tabulated in Table VI, Appendix 3.
TABLE III







Cargo Helicopter - a heavy assault,
single
-
rotor , ramp loading heli-
copter capable of lifting all




Cargo Helicopter - a medium assault
tandem
-
rotor , ramp loading heli-
copter capable of carrying the
major part of landing force equip-
ment used in helicopterborne operations.
Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel -
an armored armohibTan vehicle
required for breaching established
beach defenses and for subsequent
mechanized operations.
The list of candidate vehicles could be expanded to include
many more types. Those selected are considered most feasible (by the
writer) because they are either: a) available now, b) proven through











Landing Vehicle Tracked - A new
armored amphibian vehicle, similar
to the LVTP but somewhat smaller
with lower payload offset by
improved water and land speeds
.
A proposed air cushion vehicle
with amphibious capabilities
sufficient to embark all equipment
of the landing force.
Landing Craft Assault - a new
amphibious vehicle mounting a tank
track and suspension system
capable of embarking most landing





Cargo - a~large, wheeled amphibious
vehicle capable of embarking all
landing force equipment.
Landing Craft Utility - a large,
non-amphibious landing craft
which must discharge its payload
or be off-loaded at the water's
edge (capable of embarking all
landing force equipment)
.
Landing Craft Medium - similar




CANDIDATE SHIPS (Resource Vector Q ) 1
Vector Q
Ship ' Element Description
LPH 1 Landing Platform, Helicopter
^officially "Amphibious Assault
Ship") - a large helicopter carrier
with flight and hangar decks to
embark and operate helicopters only,
LPD 2 Landing Platform, Dock - an
amphibious ship configured with
a flight deck and small well deck
capable of, operating-, all vehiclesbut not embarking nelicopters
.
LSD 3 Landing Ship, Dock - an amphibious
ship with a large well deck capable
of embarking and operating all
vehicles except helicopters.
LST 4 Landing Ship, Tank - an amphibious
ship with a large tank deck used
to embark armored amphibians.
(LST T s are themselves capable of
beaching but are not employed in
that role in this analysis.
Certain older ship classes currently in use are not
feasible candidates for embarking and operating the vehicle types
considered by the analysis. These classes include APA ' s (Attack
Personnel Transports) and AKA's (Attack Cargo Transports).
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Theater Vehicle Employment Vectors
The elements of the theater resource employment vector X., i=l,...,4
identify:
1. The output mission(s) in which the vehicle operates
2. The ship type(s) in which the vehicle is embarked to
perform that mission.
This formulation permits a vehicle to operate from more than one ship
type to accomplish the output mission(s) for which it is selected as
a feasible candidate. Table V lists the elements of the vector X. by
ship and output mission.
As an example of the interpretation given theater employment
vector elements, consider the SK-10. The SK-10 performs in two output
missions, general amphibious unlimited and general amphibious outsize
(see Table II, Appendix 1). Table V shows, however, that it can engage
in these missions when operating from two different ship types - the
LPD (elements 6 and 7) or the LSD (elements 17 and 18).
The effect of the technique on the analysis is significant.
Individual ship and vehicle types do not compete directly for selection,
but in combinations of ships and vehicles. To see that the method
makes intuitive sense, consider again the elements 6 and 17. These
elements are respectively the number of SK-10' s operated from LPD T s
and LSD's. Since the two ship types exhibit different costs and
capacities, it seems reasonable that one combination may be preferred
to the other.
Perhaps the best way to grasp the meaning of the 27 elements
of the employment vector is to reason that each vehicle would perform
its output mission(s) in different ways if embarked in different ship
types and hence each of the elements represents a separate technique











Embarked 2Output Mission Vector X .Element
—
i
CH 53 LPH HCPTR 1
CH 53 TT TT (0) 2
CH 46 IT TT 3
LVTP LPD " AkMOREL 1 AMPHIB 4
LVTX n TT 5
SK-10 TT GEN AMPHIB 6
SK-10 TT TT (0) 7
LCA TT TT 8
LARC -60 TT TT 9
LARC-60 TT TT (0) 10
LCU TT TT 11
LCU Tt TT (0) 12
LCM-8 TT TT 13
LCM-8 TT TT (0) 14
LVTP LSD ARMORED AMPHIB 15
LVTX TT TT 16
SK-10 TT GEN AMPHIB 17
SK-10 TT TT (0) 18
LCA TT Tt 19
LARC-60 TT Tt 20
LARC-60 TT TT (0) 21
LCU TT TT 22
LCU TT TT (0) 23
LCM-8 TT Tt 24
LCM-8 TT It (0) 25
LVTP LST ARMORED AMPHIB 26
LVTX TT tt 27
Output missions are described in Appendix 1, p. 69.
2
(0) denotes that the vehicle operates in both outsize




The Distribution Submatrix K
The theater vehicle employment vector X. contains 27 elements
which identify particular levels of 9 candidate vehicles embarked in
4 ship classes competing in 5 output missions. The mathematical device
of the central and theater primal linear programs which is used to
correlate this vector with the (total) vehicle vector Q in the constraint
matrix is the submatrix K. The distribution submatrix K is a matrix
of unit coefficients which, when pre -multiplied times the employment
vector X. results in summation of the levels of each vehicle type
l
operating in designated output missions distributed over all ship classes





Costs considered in the analysis are of two types : Systems
costs, which include investment and operating costs associated with
peacetime procurement and operation of the amphibious force, and
expected wartime attrition costs.
For purposes of the analysis, it is assumed that the entire existing
amphibious vehicle force must be replaced and that there are no inherited
assets from the present force. It is further assumed that there is
no salvage value at the end of the planning cycle and that all vehicles
and ships have a ten-year system life. Costs of candidate amphibious
ships programmed to be available before 1970 are treated as sunk.
The planning cycle selected is the 10 -year period 1970-79. All
of the vehicles considered (Appendix 2) are either available now or
can be in production in sufficient time to achieve a readiness date
in 1970. No development costs are attributed to any of the vehicles
since development work on even the more advanced types (SK-10, LCA)
is substantially complete and acquisition costs are constant over any
procurement range.
Investment and Peacetime Operating Costs
Total systems costs of investment and peacetime operation are
computed as of the year 1970. That is, all investment is assumed to take
place in that year and is not discounted. Peacetime operating costs are




Since the problem is one of determining the relative cost-
effectiveness of the amphibious vehicles and ships, the preceding
costing assumptions do not favor any particular vehicle. This is true
in particular of those vehicles available in the future for which
substantially higher relative performance is anticipated. Investment
costs, if discounted in terms of time of availability^ could weight the
analysis in the direction of these more productive vehicles because
of the apparent (when viewed from the present) lower costs. Investment
and discounted peacetime operating costs of the vehicles and ships
are respectively the elements of the cost vectors C, and C~ associated
with the resource vectors Q, and Q„.
Expected Attrition Costs
The inclusion of expected attrition costs in the analysis is
at once the most sensitive aspect of the costing procedure and the
most interesting. In the analysis, expected attrition costs are
determined for each theater (SEASIA, MIDEAST, NOREUR, CI) as a
function of the estimated probability of a requirement to conduct one
amphibious operation in the particular theater, the expected total
attrition for each vehicle during the assumed period of the initial
assault and the (undiscounted) replacement cost.
Let n - probability of conducting an amphibious
operation in a particular theater
A - expected attrition for each vehicle in
each theater
R - replacement cost (equal to initial
investment cost)
P - expected attrition costs for each
vehicle type in each theater
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Then P = N A R
That is, the expected attrition cost in the ith theater is
the product of the probability of one amphibious operation in the ith
theater, expected vehicular attrition, and replacement cost. The
expected attrition costs computed for each vehicle in each theater
become the elements of the expected attrition cost vector, P., i= 1,...,4.
Table VI lists the values of these cost parameters. Clearly,
the entire analysis is sensitive to the magnitude of attrition A and
the probability of an amphibious operation N. The asserted values
are estimates based entirely on the writer's judgment. These parameters
are themselves the subject of much analysis, none of it conclusive and
all of it classified. Nothing is claimed for them except that they
are believed to be at least a reasonable estimate of the relative
ordinal ranking of probabilities between theaters and expected attrition
among the various vehicle types and provide a basic input needed for
the analysis. It is only suggested that the model constructed for the
present analysis of the problem of force selection is general in nature
and will accommodate any value which may be preferred to those chosen.
Landing Craft Costs
A special case of the general costing procedure which requires
amplification is that of the non-amphibious landing craft (the LCU and
No attrition is assumed for amphibious ships, hence no
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the LCM-8) . In order to compare the effectiveness of these craft
with other candidate vehicles it is necessary to develop a supporting
system of equipment which will permit the landing craft to compete
for a role in the amphibious ship-to-shore mission. It is first of all
apparent that these craft cannot themselves deliver tonnages inland.
The payload of landing craft must be off-loaded at the shore -line and
subsequently transported inland the distance specified by the tactical
plan.
In present-day amphibious operations the capability to off-load
landing craft at the beach is furnished by the shore party battalion
which includes the necessary cargo handling equipment. The means to
transport the landing force materiel delivered by landing craft to
inland locations is provided by motor transport battalions. It is
emphasized that these organizations are not required to support the
operations of the other vehicles of the candidate force, except for
a small command and control element of the shore party battalion which
would be required to control landward activities of the ship-to-shore
movement. Total costs of landing craft in Table VI reflect the
following contributory costs which are in addition to ordinary LCU
and LCM-8 system costs of investment and peacetime operation.
1. Three -fourths of the investment and peacetime
operating costs of a shore party battalion allocated
1/3 to the LCM-8 and 2/3 to the LCU based on estimated
numbers of LCU's and LCM-8 T s required to support
present-day MEF level operations.
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2. The cost of procuring and operating that
number of 5 -ton trucks needed to transport the
payload of each landing craft (40 trucks to support
each LCU and 12 trucks for each LCM-8)
.
Table VII lists the costs developed to reflect the "true"
costs of landing craft for comparison with amphibious vehicles.
The cost penalty assessed against the LCU and LCM-8 for
their non -amphibious characteristics is somewhat arbitrary and other
allocations could obviously be used. Nevertheless, some penalty is
required. Otherwise, these craft (which are the backbone of the




LANDING CRAFT COSTS (X10 5 ) 1
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Shore party and motor transport costs are investment + 10 yr.
discounted operating costs for these units obtained from appropriate
sections in Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

APPENDIX 4
VEHICLE OUTPUT COEFFICIENT AND SHIP CAPACITY
The constraints of the basic primal linear program from which
the decomposable dual is derived are related to specific amphibious
force output missions for delivery of the landing force ashore.
These output missions are expressed in terms of the tonnages,
times available and distances specified for the particular ship-to-
shore movement (see Appendix 1)
.
Vehicle Output Coefficient
The primary measure of effectiveness selected for evaluation
of the vehicle force is the relative capability of the various
combinations of ships and vehicles to transport and land the landing
force tonnages (output missions). Thus the magnitude and distribution
of landing force combat power ashore delivered to particular
objectives in a specified period of time are considered adequate
measures of effectiveness for the selection of the amphibious force.
The aggregate effectiveness of a particular combination
of vehicles in an output mission depends upon the separate lift
contribution of each vehicle in the selected force. Consequently
an "output" coefficient has been derived which permits computation
of the relative productivity of each vehicle.
These values are then related to each amphibious vehicle
vector X., i=l,...,4 in the constraint matrix, showing its




coefficient is computed by determining the number of round trips
which the vehicle can complete in a given time period multiplied
by its capacity in tons (including fractions of round trips above
.5, i.e. the candidate vehicle must at least be capable of reaching
the beach once in the time allowed)
.






















Vehicle water speed (mph)
Vehicle land speed (mph)
Vehicle loading and unloading time (hours)
Vehicle capacity (short tons)






The computational formula expresses the tonnage delivered by
the individual vehicle in the time and over the distance specified
by the given theater tactical plan where the expression
2DrW
2D




"Distances and speeds in nautical miles.
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The values E are coefficients of the X. vectors in each theater,
1
distributed over the ships by output mission in which each vehicle
competes and thus form the elements of the matrices E., i=l,...,4.
Table VIII contains values of E computed using the formula
above. The table also contains significant input and intermediate
values used in the computation. Times and distances used are
extracted from the tactical plan for each theater contained in
Table I, Appendix 1.
The Output Coefficient Submatrix E -^ 1=1, . .
.
,4 .
The submatrix E. is composed of unit output coefficients of
the amphibious vehicle force. It functions in the central and
theater primal linear program constraint matrices to correlate
the aggregate output of the force in a particular theater with
the theater output mission vector L., i=l,...,4. The submatrix E.
when pre -multiplied times the theater employment vector X. sums
the output of all vehicle types over all ship types by output
mission. One element ofE.X., for example, adds the output tonnages
of the SK-10's, LCA's, LARC-60's, LCU's and LCM-8 T s embarked in
both LPD's and LSD's engaged in meeting the general amphibious
unlimited output mission in an individual theater.
Ship Embarkation Capacity
Table IX tabulates ship embarkation capacity for each vehicle
type. The inverse of the particular ship's capacity for a certain
type of vehicle is the per unit requirement of the vehicle for that
ship class. These inverse values are the elements of the per unit
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~These embarkation capacities are very rough estimates based
generally on unclassified ship and vehicle characteristics contained
in the Amphibious Planning Exercise APEX previously cited.
2
A zero entry in the table indicates that the ship is not
suitable for embarking and operating the particular vehicle type.
See Table V, Appendix 1 for correlation with theater output
missions employment vectors X., i=l,...,4.
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The Ship Vehicle Embarkation Requirement Submatrix F
Elements of the ship vector Q„ are the levels of amphibious
ships needed to embark the vehicle force. The F submatrix of the
constraint matrices in the central and theater primal linear programs
provides for comparison of theater requirements for amphibious ships
with the vector Q~ . The elements of the F submatrix are the per unit
vehicle requirements for amphibious ships. For example, elements
of F correlated with X. elements 4, 15 and 26 have the values 1/43,
1/54 and 1/22 . These are respectively that portion of the total
LVTP capacity of an LPD, LSD and LST needed to embark one LVTP.
Premultiplying the theater employment vector X. by the
submatrix F results in the summation of vehicle requirements for
amphibious ships by ship class. One element of the submatrix FX
.
adds, for example, the number of LPD's embarking SK-10's in the
general amphibious unlimited role to the number of LPD's embarking
the LVTX operating in the armored amphibian output mission and so
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